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UNITED STATES V. CARLOSS: AN UNCLEAR AND
DANGEROUS THREAT TO FOURTH AMENDMENT

PROTECTIONS OF THE HOME AND CURTILAGE
ABSTRACT

Through UnitedStates v. Carloss,the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has legitimized a belief that nothing can prevent police from approaching
a home to conduct knock-and-talks. A knock-and-talk is a widely used
police tactic that allows the police to knock on the door of a home to ask
the inhabitant questions without a warrant or probable cause. This
Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit should have considered
constitutional precedent and protections regarding the home and curtilage,
like Judge Gorsuch in his dissent, and the impact such an unclear ruling
would have on potential abuses of power and the community.
Furthermore, this Comment offers a recommendation to courts on how to
evaluate knock-and-talks in a way that protects civilian liberties granted
under the Constitution as well as allow police to efficiently and effectively
conduct investigations without endangering officer safety.
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INTRODUCTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'

The Fourth Amendment was drafted as a direct response to the
English practice of issuing general warrants which allowed officials of the
Crown to conduct a broad search of the home to find evidence to
incriminate suspects. 2 Today, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government without
probable cause and guarantees the "right to privacy" and protection for
persons, papers, effects, homes, and curtilages. 3
Though the Supreme Court has imposed "a presumptive warrant
requirement for searches and seizures[,] and generally requires probable
cause for a warrantless search or seizure to be 'reasonable[,]"' there are
exceptions.' Through numerous cases, the Court has carved out many
exceptions for purposes of law enforcement.' One exception, the impliedlicense exception, is routinely utilized by police departments to conduct
"knock-and-talks," a tactic which involves police approaching a home and
6
entering its curtilage, without a warrant.
Throughout the country, courts have analyzed knock-and-talks
differently and have come to different legal conclusions on the practice.
Recently, knock-and-talks were analyzed by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Contrary to historical and constitutional reasoning, the court
concluded that "No Trespassing" signs did not revoke the implied license
for knock-and-talks. 7 However, the decision was not unanimous; all three
Republican-nominated judges8 came to different conclusions regarding
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2.

SAM KAMIN & RICARDO J. BASCUAS, INVESTIGATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5, 7 (2d ed.

2013).
3. Id. at 5-6.
4. Article, Investigations and Police Practices, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 3
(2015).
5. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 85 (1998); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986).
6. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).
United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir.) ("As an initial matter, just the
7.
presence of a 'No Trespassing' sign is not alone sufficient to convey to an objective officer, or member
of the public, that he cannot go to the front door and knock."), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016).
8. Senior Judge David M.
Ebel, U.S.
CT. APPEALS
FOR 10TH CIR.,
https://www.calO.uscourts.gov/judges/senior-judge-david-m-ebel (last visited Nov. 9, 2017); Chief
Judge
Timothy
M.
Tymkovich,
U.S.
CT.
APPEALS
FOR
10TH
CIR.,
https://www.cal0.uscourts.gov/judges/judge-timothy-m-tymkovich (last visited Nov. 9, 2017); Judge
Neil

M.

Gorsuch,

U.S.

CT.

APPEALS

FOR

10TH

CIR.,
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whether the knock-and-talk constituted a search within the Fourth
Amendment when "No Trespassing" signs were present.' Despite the
differences in opinion, the majority did not stamp out the belief that law
enforcement has an irrevocable right to conduct knock-and-talks. On
October 3, 2016, any hopes to correct or clarify the court's holding faded
when the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari regarding the case.o
This Comment analyzes the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' most
recent decision on knock-and-talks, UnitedStates v. Carloss," specifically
the appropriate concerns addressed by newly confirmed Supreme Court
Justice Gorsuch in his dissentl 2 and the consequences this decision may
have on the Tenth Circuit. Section II of this Comment summarizes the
Fourth Amendment protections for the home and curtilage and the current
jurisprudence of knock-and-talks through prior court decisions. Section III
summarizes the facts and holding of the court's decision in Carloss, which
held that "No Trespassing" signs did not sufficiently revoke an implied
license to approach the front door.' 3 Section IV focuses on reasons why
the court's decision is problematic by analyzing the court's disregard for
the constitutional protections granted to the curtilage and the potential
abuse the practice of knock-and-talks may now have under the vague and
unworkable ruling. Section V offers a recommendation that knock-andtalks be conducted under the same standard as stop-and-frisks to protect
the privacy interest of many innocent citizens. Section VI discusses how
the recommendation may have applied in Carloss's case. Section VII
concludes this Comment by explaining how the unfavorable ruling will
erode Fourth Amendment protections.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Modern Theories ofFourth Amendment Protection
The current jurisprudence surrounding Fourth Amendment
protections revolve around two theories: a property trespass theory and a
reasonable expectation of privacy theory. The property trespass theory,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170203174008/http://www.cal O.uscourts.gov:80/judges/judge-neilm-gorsuch (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).

9.
Carloss, 818 F.3d at 995-96 (stating in an opinion authored by Judge Ebel that the "No
Trespassing" signs in the yard and side yards could not be considered because Carloss did not claim
they were included in the home's curtilage and the "No Trespassing" sign on the door was ambiguous;
therefore, the officers had a right to enter under the implied license and there was no constitutional

intrusion); id. at 1001 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (stating under the implied license the police may
approach a door and knock as "any private citizen might do" and the subjective intent does not matter
because knock-and-talks are characterized as investigations pursuant to the implicit license); id. at
1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("[A] 'search' occurs when the government physically enters a
constitutionally protected area like a home or its curtilage for investigative purposes.").

10.
11.
12.
13.

Carloss, 137 S. Ct. at 231.
818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016).
Id. at 1003-15 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 997 (majority opinion).
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initially discussed by the Court in 1928, focuses on a narrow and literal
text-based interpretation of "search."l 4 This interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment protection was overruled by Katz v. United States15 in 1967,
in favor of a broader definition and the idea that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."l 6
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that Katz's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when officers recorded a conversation he had while
inside a telephone booth.1 7 The majority concluded that the police had
committed an unreasonable search by evaluating if Katz had an
expectation of privacy and if that expectation was reasonable.' This rule,
also known as the Katz rule, has been applied to limit privacy protection
for activities voluntarily exposed to the public's view' 9 or conducted in
open fields.2 0 The rule has also been utilized to protect a citizen's
2
reasonable expectation of privacy from sense-enhancing technology. In
2012, the Court set the Katz rule aside and reintroduced the physical
property trespass theory as another avenue to Fourth Amendment
protections in United States v. Jones.2 2 In Jones, the Court held that a
search also occurs within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when the government obtains information by physically intruding on a
person or their property.2 3
B. Current FourthAmendment JurisprudenceRegarding the Home
Currently, the Fourth Amendment protects the home against
unreasonable searches and seizures because the Supreme Court has
interpreted the amendment to mean that probable cause alone is not
enough to justify a warrantless entry into a home. 24 However, this
protection has two exceptions: consent and exigent circumstances.
1. Consent Exception
Under the consent exception, police may enter a home without a
warrant if there is consent from the homeowner or someone with common

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351-53.
Id. at 352, 359.
Id. at 351-52.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-13 (1986).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-81 (1984).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001).
565 U.S. 400 (2012); id. at 404-07.
Id. at 406-07.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) ("[T]he Amendment contained two

separate clauses, the first protecting the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
and the second requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause. . . . It is thus
perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a
general warrant. Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are
condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment.").
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authority.25 The idea of common authority was introduced in 1974 through
United States v. Matlock.26 In Matlock, the Supreme Court examined
whether a person with common control of a residence could give consent
to search the home against an opposing tenant who was legally removed.27
The Supreme Court held that voluntary consent may be obtained from a
third party who possesses common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effect sought to be inspected. 28 The Court
defined common authority as follows:
[M]utual use of the property by persons generally having joint access
for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched.29
Some sixteen years later, in Illinois v. Rodriguez,30 the Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of whether a warrantless search
violated the Fourth Amendment when officers did not actually receive
consent from someone who legitimately possessed common authority. 3 1in
Rodriguez, when the police entered an apartment without a warrant under
the mistaken belief that they had received consent from someone with
common authority, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless entry into a
home is valid when officers reasonably believe the person giving consent
has authority to do so. 3 2 The Court reasoned that the test was not whether
the party actually had any authority over the premises, but rather whether
it was reasonable to believe that consent was granted from a party with
authority. 3
2. Exigent Circumstances Exception
Absent consent, the police may enter a home without a warrant in
cases of exigent circumstances. The exigent circumstances exception was
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1980 through Payton v. New York.34
In Payton, the Court analyzed whether an illegal search and seizure took
place when police entered Payton's home with probable cause but without
a warrant or exigent circumstances. 3 5 The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited warrantless entries into a home to search for
weapons or contraband absent exigent circumstances, even when there is
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 166-67, 171-72.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 171 n.7.
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Id. at 179.
Id. at 188-89.
Id.
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Id. at 574-76.
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probable cause. 36 The Court reasoned that the entrance to a person's home
was a critical point where constitutional safeguards are heightened even
when probable cause exists or when there is statutory authority permitting
the searches.37
Over time, the Supreme Court has identified several exigencies that
may justify a warrantless search of a home. The first exception recognized
by the Court is the emergency aid exception addressed in Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart.38 The Court held that "officers may enter a home without
a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury."" The second exception
recognized by the Court is the hot pursuit exception addressed in United
States v. Santana.40 In Santana, the Court held that police officers may
enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect. 4 ' The third exception recognized by the Court was the imminent
42
destruction of evidence exception in Kentucky v. King. In King, the Court
reaffirmed that officers may enter an apartment or home without a warrant
43
when there is a reasonable belief that evidence is being destroyed. The
Court also concluded that officers may seize evidence in plain view so
long as they did not arrive at the spot of the evidence through a violation
of the Fourth Amendment."
C. CurrentFourth Amendment JurisprudenceRegarding the Curtilage
The current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also outlines
constitutional protections for the curtilage to protect the privacy interest of
citizens from intrusions by government actors without warrants or
probable cause. 4 5 However, Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the
Fourth Amendment protections of the curtilage have outlined exceptions
for the warrant and probable cause requirements. 4 6

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 587-90.
Id. at 588-90.
547 U.S. 398 (2006); id. at 400 (addressing "whether police may enter a home without a

warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously
injured or imminently threatened with such injury").

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 403.
427 U.S. 38 (1976).
Id. at 42-43.
563 U.S. 452 (2011).
Id. at 460, 462.
Id. at 462-63.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) ("The distinction implies that only the

curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to
the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated

with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' and therefore has been considered part
of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment

protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference
to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately
adjacent to the home will remain private." (citation omitted)).

46.
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6-8 (2013) (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
469-70 (2011); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57 (1924)).
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In 1984, the Court recognized the curtilage as an area protected under
the Fourth Amendment through Oliver v. United States,47 when upholding
the actions of police officers searching an open field for evidence of a
crime. 4 8 The Court concluded that only a home's curtilage, the area
immediately surrounding or attached to the home, is protected by the
Fourth Amendment because the curtilage protects intimate activities of the
home. 49 In 1987, the Court clarified the extent of the curtilage protection
through UnitedStates v. Dunnso by establishing four factors that should be
evaluated when considering whether an area is a part of the curtilage: (1)
the proximity of the area to the home, (2) whether the area is within an
enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature and use of the area, and (4)
the steps taken to protect the area from observation by a passerby.s"
52
In 2013, through Floridav. Jardines,
the Court formally recognized
that there was an implied license for others to enter into the curtilage to
knock on the door and that license also extended to police officers. 53
However, the Court was careful to clarify that the implied license did not
allow police officers to enter the curtilage to look for evidence without
consent or a warrant, concluding that the implied license depended on an
officer's purpose. 54

D. CurrentJurisprudenceRegardingKnock-and-Talks
A knock-and-talk is a police procedure conducted for the purpose of
obtaining consent to speak with a homeowner or to make a warrantless
entry.55 Current case law regarding knock-and-talks has done little to
restrain this procedure because of a belief that the entire interaction is
consensual and not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.16 Given the
unrestrained nature of knock-and-talks, police departments throughout the
nation have begun utilizing the tactic as a way around the Fourth
Amendment because, once inside the home, they may gather any evidence
that is in plain view. 57
The Supreme Court has discussed knock-and-talks on two
occasions-once directly and once indirectly. While the Court did not
directly address knock-and-talks when reaching a conclusion in King, the
Court recognized that when officers do not have a warrant, an occupant
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

466 U.S. 170.
Id. at 176, 179.
Id. at 180.
480 U.S. 294 (1987).
Id. at 301.
569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.

55.
[an Dooley, Fightingfor Equal Protection Under the FourthAmendment: Why "Knockand- Talks" Should Be Reviewed Under the Same ConstitutionalStandardas "Stop-and-Frisks,"40
NOVA L. REv. 213, 218 (2016).

56.
57.

Id. at 214.
See id. at 220.
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has no obligation to open the door or to speak, and even if the door is
opened, the occupant need not let them in.5 ' Knock-and-talks were directly
addressed in Jardines, when the Court was asked whether a dog sniff at
the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection
dog was a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause. 59 The
Court found that the physical intrusion was not licensed by the implied
consent of social norms because, unlike a knock-and-talk, the officer
brought along a sense-enhancing animal to conduct a search under the
pretense of a knock-and-talk.60
Through King and Jardines, the Supreme Court has outlined
guidelines which should govern the use of knock-and-talks. While both
King and Jardines held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when an
officer trespasses on a constitutionally protected area for the purposes of
conducting a search, Jardineswent a little further by explaining that under
an implied license, an officer can do "no more than any private citizen
might do" and whether an officer has an implied license to enter the
curtilage depends on the purpose for entry.6 1
II. UNITED STA TES V. CARLOSS
A. Facts

After receiving tips that Ralph Carloss, a convicted felon, unlawfully
possessed firearms and sold drugs, law enforcement officials went to the
home, where Carloss resided, to investigate.62 The officers knocked on the
front door to speak with Carloss, despite numerous professionally printed
"No Trespassing" signs in the yard, along the sidewalk, and on the front
door.63 After the officers knocked for several minutes, Carloss emerged
from the home and was questioned regarding the allegations.' Carloss
informed the officers that he was not allowed to be around ammunition
because of prior convictions and denied their subsequent request to search
the home by stating that he was not the homeowner and could not give
permission. 6 When Carloss entered the home to seek permission, the
officers followed him in after asking if it was okay to enter and wait
inside. 66 While in the home, the officers observed drug paraphernalia and
what appeared to be methamphetamine in Carloss's room. 67 Earnest Dry,
the homeowner, refused to allow the officers to search without a warrant

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469-70 (2011).
Jardines,569 U.S. at 3-5.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8, 10 (quoting King, 563 U.S. at 469).
United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991.
See id.
Id.
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and asked them to leave.68 The officers later obtained a warrant based on
their observations while in the home and returned.69 During the search,
officers found "'multiple methamphetamine labs' and lab components, a
loaded shot gun, two blasting caps, ammunition, and . . . drug

paraphernalia." 70
B. ProceduralHistory
After the search, Dry and Carloss were arrested and charged with
multiple drug and weapon offenses.71 Dry and Carloss moved to suppress
the evidence found in the home by arguing that Carloss's consent was the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation. 72 The motion was denied and
Carloss accepted a conditional guilty plea which allowed him to appeal the
court's ruling on his motion to suppress the evidence found in the home.73
C. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Ebel, held that the officers
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, in light of the Jardinesdecision,
by conducting a knock-and-talk in efforts to speak with Carloss and that
Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers accompanying him into the
home. 74 The majority found that, post-Jardines, the Tenth Circuit has
upheld the constitutionality of knock-and-talks, holding that there is an
implied license for members of the public, including police, to go onto the
curtilage of a home to knock on the front door.7 Additionally, whether the:
implied license has been revoked depends on the context in which "anofficer seeking to conduct a knock-and-talk, encountered the signs and the
message that those signs would have conveyed to an objective officer . .
under the circumstances." 76
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the "No
Trespassing" signs placed around the home would not have conveyed to
an objective officer that he could not go to the front door and knock to
speak consensually with Carloss. 7 ' Moreover, the court refused to place a
time limit on how long a person can knock before exceeding the scope of
an implied license when there was no evidence that the officers knocked
aggressively or demanded entry. 7' The court gave two reasons to support
their finding that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers
accompanying him into the home. First, Carloss's consent was not the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 991, 994, 998.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 997-98.
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product of a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no
violation.79 Second, it was unreasonable to believe that because Carloss
declined to give the officers consent to search the home that he could not
consent to their accompanying him into the home while he sought
permission for the search."
D. ConcurringOpinion
The concurring opinion, authored by Chief Judge Tymkovich, held
that the Fourth Amendment test asks "whether police intruded without
license into a constitutionally-protected area, and . . . whether they

obtained information via that intrusion."' The question of "whether the
officers had an implied license to enter the porch .

.

. depends on the

'

purpose for which they entered." 82 The concurrence reasoned that a "mere
investigatory purpose will not invalidate an otherwise licensed police
entry into the curtilage in every instance" and that intent was irrelevant
under the implied license. 83 Moreover, a homeowner has the ability to
revoke the implied license by opting out of social norms and making his
revocation clear to a reasonable person.8 4 The concurrence concluded by
stating that the court must deploy an objective test and a general rule
asking "whether a reasonable person would conclude that entry onto the
curtilage . . by police or others was categorically barred." 8
E. DissentingOpinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Gorsuch, addressed the
implications of the court's holding and its departure from precedent and
common law.86 The dissent first analyzed the consensual theory behind
knock-and-talks and the curtilage protection. 87 The dissent reasoned that
the consensual theory behind knock-and-talks and the curtilage protection
were at odds with each other because, while the curtilage is protected by
the Fourth Amendment and requires police to have a warrant, exigent
circumstances, or consent to enter a home or to reach the front door, the
government has suggested that officers enjoy an irrevocable right to enter
a home's curtilage to conduct knock-and-talks. 8 Second, the dissent
examined historical evidence and the common law rule, which held that
posted signs were sufficient to ward off unwanted visitors.89 Third, the
dissent concluded that the majority's holding was unclear and would invite
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 998.
at 998-99.
at 1001 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring).
at 1002.
at 1001-02.
at 999.
(emphasis omitted).
at 1003 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
at 1006-07.
at 1004-06.
at 1009-10.
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more cases because of the specificity of the analysis concerning the
placement and content of a sign. 90
III.

DISCUSSION

Police frequently utilize knock-and-talks to circumvent warrant
requirements for purposes of obtaining information on behalf of the public
good, obtaining consent to enter or search, or making a warrantless
arrest. 9' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has set a dangerous precedent
through Carloss by holding that an implied license had not been revoked
despite the presence of "No Trespassing" signs because the decision
disregards current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and will have
dangerous consequences for communities most at risk police interactions.
Judge Gorsuch's dissent addressed most of these concerns when he
questioned why the majority ruled in favor of the government though they
disagreed with all the reasons brought forth by the government.92 While
the majority might not have meant to approve the government's suggestion.
that it enjoys an irrevocable right to enter a home's curtilage to conduct a
knock-and-talk,93 its holding only complicated the matter by focusing on
the content of the "No Trespassing" signs and the lack of a fence.
Moreover, the court's failure to provide any real guidance or notice to
police or citizens about when the implied license has been rescinded will
ultimately lead to an abuse of the rule and police powers.
A. Disregardfor ConstitutionalProtectionsand Precedent
Given the courts' belief that knock-and-talks are consensual
procedures, the tactic is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.9 4
Therefore, instead of addressing whether police have a justification to
knock on a private door, the current rules analyze what happens after
police intrude into a private area.9 5 This practice is inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence set in Jones and Jardines, which held
that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when an officer trespasses on a
constitutionally protected area for the purposes of conducting a search.96
Though the Jardines Court did not directly address the lawfulness of
knock-and-talks, the Court limited the use of the implied license by
holding that the existence of an implied license for officers to enter the
porch "depends upon the purpose for which they entered." 97 Moreover, the
Court concluded that an implied license is undermined when an officer's

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1014.
Dooley, supra note 55, at 218.
Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1004, 1008, 1015.
Id. at 1004.

94.

See Dooley, supra note 55, at 214.

95.
96.
(2012).
97.

Id. at 223-24.
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5, 10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407
Jardines,569 U.S. at 10.
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behavior goes beyond what property owners would ordinarily tolerate or
expect from a visitor. 9 8 While the limitations established in Jardines are
consistent with the curtilage doctrine and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' misinterpretation of
Jardines and disregard for the curtilage doctrine is problematic and
inconsistent for a number of reasons.
First, the majority's opinion ignores historical precedent and fails to
set out a clear and concise rule of when an individual has revoked the
implied license. 99 Traditionally, the implied license could be revoked by
express words or an act indicating an intention to revoke; there was no
requirement that one show notice by word and deed.' 00 In 1951, through
Beard v. Alexandria,'0 ' the Supreme Court recognized that a homeowner
may bar visitors from entering private property to knock at the front door
by "notice or order."' 0 2 Moreover, several courts have specifically held
that "No Trespassing" signs can revoke the implied license to enter
regardless of whether the person seeking entry is a lay person or a police
officer.103 Despite the established common law principles and case
precedent regarding revocation of the implied license, the majority in
Carloss held that signs did not revoke the license given the circumstances,
while the concurrence reasoned that a "No Trespassing" sign absent a
fence or obstacle does not adequately revoke the implied license.' 0 4
Second, the majority's opinion strays from the current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by failing to establish that police do not have
an irrevocable right to approach a home for the purposes of conducting a
knock-and-talk'o and finding that Carloss voluntarily consented to the
officers accompanying him into the home.' 0 6 In 2013, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the implied license to knock allowed an officer to do "no
more than any private citizen might do."'o7 Moreover, the Court
recognized that a search occurs whenever the government physically
enters a constitutionally protected area, like a home or its curtilage, to
conduct a search. 0 8 Therefore, while an officer returning a lost dog or
soliciting for a charity is not conducting a search within the Fourth
Amendment, an officer called to investigate a crime is conducting a search
Id. at 8-9.
98.
United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1008-13 (10th Cir.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), cert.
99.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016).
100.
Id. at 1009.
101. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
102. Id. at 626, 626 n.2 (citing collected cases).
103. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1010, 1010 n.10 (citing collected cases).
104. Id. at 990 (majority opinion); see id. at 1000-01 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("A homeowner may post as many 'No Trespassing'
signs as she wishes. She might add a wall or a medieval-style moat, too. Maybe razor wire and
battlements and mantraps besides. Even that isn't enough to revoke the state's right to enter.").

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 998-99 (majority opinion).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).
See id. at lL.
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within the Fourth Amendment.' 0 9 However, Carloss threatens the
guidance of this clear and concise distinction in three ways: the decision
implies police have the ability to approach any home without restraint
under knock-and-talks, it does not provide any guidance to citizens on how
to sufficiently revoke the implied license, and it fails to provide any
guidance to government officials on when they possess an implied
license."o
Third, instead of ensuring that citizens retain the constitutional
protections granted under the Fourth Amendment, Carloss ultimately
gives government officials a way to circumvent Fourth Amendment
requirements by holding that Carloss, a third party in Dry's home, had the
authority to consent to officers accompanying him into the home."' The
court failed to evaluate whether a reasonable officer would have believed
that Carloss had authority to consent to the entry of another person's home.
Moreover, the court failed to require the government to satisfy its burdenof proving that Carloss had actual or apparent authority to consent to a
search or warrantless entry of the home.1 2 To show actual authority, the
government must show that the person who consented had either mutual
use of the home by virtue ofjoint access or control for most purposes over
the home." 3 To show apparent authority, the government must show the
officer had a reasonable belief that the person who consented had actual
authority to do so. "' If the court had asked for this burden to be fulfilled
in Carloss, the government would have had great difficulty proving
Carloss had actual or apparent authority to consent to entry of the home
because Carloss acknowledged and notified the officers of his limited
authority in the home when they initially asked to search the home.
Fourth, the majority opinion does not provide any real guidance on
the structure or use of knock-and-talks because the court engaged in a
nuanced and ambiguous analysis of specific factual circumstances that
only brings more questions than answers."' Instead of suggesting that "No
Trespassing" signs are categorically insufficient to revoke the implied
license, the majority accepted the view that signs could revoke the license
and argued that Carloss's signs did not revoke the license because the
terms were ambiguous." 6 The result of a holding based on a fact-specific
analysis leads to a patchwork of jurisprudence, where courts focus on
109.
Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
110.
See id. at 1005, 1014.
111.
Id. at 998 (majority opinion) (finding that "the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers following him into the house").
112. See United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating the government has
the burden of proving that the party who consented to a search had either actual or apparent authority
to consent to the search).

113.
United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating the mutual use
analysis is very fact oriented while the control for most purposes could be satisfied by a presumption).
114.
Cos, 498 F.3d at 1128.
115.
Carloss,818 F.3d at 1012-15 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at l012.
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issues like the size of shrubs, fences, or the placement of signs, instead of
whether police were justified in knocking on the door."' Moreover, such
analysis causes the court to rarely engage in a detailed discussion of
whether the government met its burden to prove if consent was given or
whether the government was justified in approaching the door." 8
B. UnclearRuling Will Lead to Abuse ofPower
While a police officer's knock on the door may not be troubling on
its face, the prevalent use of the procedure can be seen as problematic if
the courts and the public focused on how a lack ofjudicial guidance affects
the coercive nature of knock-and-talks and deteriorates police and
community relations. Police often utilize the knock-and-talk technique
because it allows them to act without a warrant or probable cause, it is a
simple and effective way of obtaining information, and it allows police to
seize any evidence of a crime in the officer's plain view." 9 Moreover,
under the Schneckloth doctrine, a waiver for searches and seizures does
not require informed consent. 2 0 Therefore, an individual's knowledge of
the right is not taken into account when examining whether consent was
voluntary, and officers have no duty to inform individuals of their right to
refuse consent.' 2 ' Since the Schneckloth doctrine's original application,
critics have complained that it creates two diverging perspectives
regarding the nature of consent to search: as an honest appeal between
equal consensual parties or a demand where choice is illusory given the
unbalance power structure between the parties involved.' 22 Despite the
differing perspectives, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to recognize
the inherently coercive nature of knock-and-talks in constitutionally
protected areas.1 23 However, a number of lower courts have expressed an
uneasiness with the tactic and have attempted to curb how knock-and-talks
are utilized by embracing a realistic view of what happens during the
encounter to protect the rights of citizens and prevent further erosion of
Fourth Amendment protections.14

117.

Dooley, supra note 55, at 226.

118.

Andrew Eppich, Wolf at the Door: Issues of Place and Race in the Use of the "Knock and

Talk" Policing Technique, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 119, 138 (2012).
Id. at 124-25.
119.
Id. at 137.
120.
Id. at 136.
121.
Id. at 139.
122.
Id. at 139-40.
123.
State v. Huddy, 799 S.E.2d 650, 653 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that "the State cannot
124.
rely on the knock and talk doctrine because the officer did more than merely knock and talk. The
officer ran a license plate not visible from the street, walked around the house examining windows

and searching for signs of a break-in, and went first to the front door (without knocking) and then to a
rear door not visible from the street and located behind a closed gate"); Dana Chicklas, Michigan
Supreme CourtHears OralArguments in "Knock and Talk" MarijuanaButter Case, FOx 17W. MICH.

(Mar. 9, 2017, 7:11 PM), http://foxl7online.com/2017/03/09/michigan-supreme-court-hears-oralarguments-in-knock-and-talk-marijuana-butter-case

(hearing oral arguments on whether the timing of

knock and talks play into their constitutionality and coercion of consent).
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The former chiefjustice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, Jim Hannah,
painted a vivid picture of what knock-and-talks truly entail by stating the
following:
[A]sking questions is often no longer necessarily the primary purpose
of a knock and talk. Often it is not one officer, but two or more who
approach the door. Many times, the intent in going to a citizen's door
is not to talk but to obtain consent to search. Common practice is
illustrated by the testimony of one law enforcement officer who, when
asked about action taken on an anonymous tip, stated, "People call in
and tell us, and we go and check. And if they wanna let us in we do.
Eighty percent of 'em just let us come in and look." Law enforcement
utilizes the knock and talk in lieu of a warrant when they recognize
that they do not have probable or reasonable cause to obtain a search
warrant. This misuse of a knock and talk causes concern that the
protections against warrantless searches are being eroded. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that "when the
police go to a home with the intention of searching for evidence, they
may not forgo a warrant." Yet, that is the very purpose of many knock
and talk encounters today. 125
Former Chief Justice Hannah's description of the reality of knockand-talks, coupled with the lack of initiative police officers have to notify
individuals of their rights under the Schneckloth doctrine, displays how the
Supreme Court's skewed view of the tactic potentially endangers
communities most at risk of facing police interaction and those who lack
knowledge of their rights.
Statistics show that poor and minority communities are most at risk
of facing law enforcement, less likely to have confidence in the police, and
less likely to believe that the police will treat them equally with their white
counterparts.1 2 6 Those fears, beliefs, and concerns are not unfounded.
American studies have found that police officers typically stereotype
residents of minority communities as uncooperative, estranged, or hostile
based on a belief of ecological contamination; use coercion more often in
minority communities than in white communities; and engage in more
misconduct in disadvantaged minority neighborhoods.' 27 Despite statistics
showing that police officers treat and perceive minorities differently
because of their race, ethnicity, and place of residence, the Supreme Court
has been unwilling to address the realities that minority communities face
during interactions with the police. Rather, the Court has established
standards that appear on their face to be colorblind and class blind but
125.

Jim Hannah, Forgotten Law and JudicialDuty, 70 ALB. L. REv. 829, 837 (2007).

126.

Bruce Drake, Divide Between Blacks and Whites on Police Runs Deep, PEW RES. CTR.

(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/28/blacks-whites-police.
127.
Ronald Weitzer & Rod K. Brunson, PolicingDifferent Racial Groups in the UnitedStates,
35
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135-36

(2015),

https://sociology.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/sociology.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Weitzer%/
20%26%20Brunson%202015%20.pdf.
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which have exceptions that solely apply to minority and poor
communities.1 28
By allowing police officers to circumvent the warrant requirement
through knock-and-talks, the level of trust between citizens and law
enforcement is reduced, 12 9 the chance of incidental fatality is increased, 130
and citizens are left feeling helpless and unprotected by the law and
courts.131 Knock-and-talks rely heavily on the discretion of the police with
little direction to guide or check their actions. 132 Though the technique may
be convenient for police to use, the technique significantly reduces the
special protection of the home for minorities and the poor because of their
proximity to areas that police perceive to be high crime.133 Moreover,
frequent use of the technique "can create the perception that one's
home .. . is constantly under siege by the police."' 3 4 While knock-andtalks may be successful in obtaining criminal evidence, the Court should
question whether the governmental interest in the intrusion outweighs
society's right to privacy within the home and curtilage and whether
guidance in the utilization of the tactic would actually result in the practice
being applied equally and fairly among white and minority communities.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Presently, Justices of the Supreme Court have adopted a false
narrative surrounding knock-and-talks which views the tactic as
consensual because social visitors have an implied license to approach a
door and the conversational aspect of the situation discredits the possibility
of coercion.135 While Jardinesattempted to establish guidelines for knock128.

See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (utilizing a neighborhood's crime

level and the sole act ofrunning away unprovoked in a high crime neighborhood as majorjustifications

for reasonable suspicion).
129.
Eppich, supra note 118, at 146-47; Kirk Mitchell, Denver Jury Awards $1.8 Million to
Family in Wrongful Prosecution Case, DENV. POST (Apr. 27, 2016, 1:21 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/09/26/denver-jury-awards-1 -8-million-to-family-in-wrongfulprosecution-case (discussing how officers made false charges against a family to divert attention from

their own misconduct stemming from a knock-and-talk).
130.
See, e.g., Henry Pierson Curtis, Lawsuit Filed in Police "Knock-and-Talk" Killing of
Orlando
Teen,
ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(Jan.
16,
2015,
4:39
PM),

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-knock-and-talk-orlando-lawsuit-20150116story.html (discussing the wrongful-death lawsuit filed against the Orlando police for killing a
teenager during a controversial knock-and-talk).
131.
Mark Joseph Stem, Appeals Court: Officer Who Shot and Killed Innocent Man in His Own

Home

Cannot

Be

Sued,

SLATE

(Mar.

17,

2017,

4:31

PM),

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the.slatest/201 7/03/17/appeals.cour trulesofficer_whokilledmani n
his own home cannot be sued.html (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's holding that an officer who

shot and killed innocent man in his own home during knock-and-talk could not be sued).
132.
Eppich, supra note 118, at 148.
133.
See id. at 147, 150.
134.
Id. at 147.
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469-70 (2011) ("When law enforcement officers who are
135.
not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And
whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer
or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak."); see also Florida v.

Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) ("This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home

2018]

AN UNCLEAR AND DANGEROUS THREAT

535

and-talks, the confusing, circular nature of the reasoning behind the
holdingl 36 has resulted in various conflicting decisions across the
country.1 3 7 However, one consistent factor that has progressed, despite the
various results, is the false narrative surrounding knock-and-talks.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's belief that knock-and-talks are not being
used to solely conduct searches, some police forces have assembled
knock-and-talk task forces whose sole duty is to approach a home and ask
for entry.' 38 Because knock-and-talks are being used as an investigatory
tool by police departments across the country, courts should apply
reasonable time constraints and the reasonable suspicion standard, first
established in Terry v. Ohio,1 39 to knock-and-talks when evaluating their
constitutionality.
Jardines established that the implied license gave a customary
invitation for visitors to "approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger
longer) leave."' 4 0 However, the Court did not clarify the time of day that
knock-and-talks could be conducted under the implied license or discuss'
whether the timing of a knock-and-talk could make it coercive. This issue
is currently being discussed in the Michigan Supreme Court regarding a
case in which police conducted knock-and-talks at four o' clock in the
morning and five thirty in the morning.'4 1 When the prosecution in that
case attempted to assert that, though unusual, the public may customarily
expect officers at that time of morning, Michigan Supreme Court Justice,
Young interjected that it is never customarily expected for armed and,
vested officers to arrive at a person's home in the early hours except in an
emergency.1 42 Given the flawed belief that police are able to approach the
home at any time of the day or night "4' and the fatalities involved in those
decisions," it would be best for the Court to establish a reasonable time
by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent an invitation to linger
longer) leave.").

136.

See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10 ("[W]hether the officer's conduct was an objectively

reasonable search . . depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch,
which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they have entered.").

137.

See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 392 F. App'x 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that

the officers' conduct during their knock-and-talk, which included banging on doors and windows and

breaking the glass on Hernandez's door, then relying on her admission that an illegal alien was present
as probable cause to enter, violated the Fourth Amendment); see also, e.g., United States v. Perea-

Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the warrantless intrusion by border patrol
agents violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because to do otherwise would swallow the

curtilage protection); People v. Nelson, 296 P.3d 177, 184 (Colo. App. 2012) (holding that officers
may use a ruse to get a person to open the door so they can conduct a knock-and-talk).

138.
Jamesa J. Drake, Knock and Talk No More, 67 ME. L. REv. 25, 35 (2014) (discussing how
the Dallas Police Department has a "46-member knock-and-talk task force" and the Orange County
Florida Sheriffs Office has an entire division dedicated to the tactic).
139.
392 U.S. 1 (1968); id. at 30.
140. Jardines,569 U.S. at 8.
141.
Chicklas, supra note 124.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144.

See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 130; Stem, supra note 131.
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period for police officers conducting knock-and-talks to approach the
home. The time period in which police are allowed to conduct knock-andtalks should be similar to that of an unexpected private citizen, such as
eight o' clock in the morning and six o' clock in the evening, to protect
civilian rights and increase officer safety.
In addition to introducing a time constraint, the Court should evaluate
knock-and-talks under Terry's reasonable suspicion standard. In Terry, a
case in which an officer stopped and searched three men after observing
them walking in repeated cycles and staring into a store, the Court held
that a warrantless search for weapons is reasonable when officers have a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed.' 4 5 The Court reasoned that when assessing the reasonableness
of a stop, the focus should be on the governmental interest that allegedly
justifies the official intrusion on constitutionally protected interests and
whether the officer is able to point to a specific or articulable fact that
reasonably warrants that intrusion.1461The Court's reasoning showed its
concern for the social implications of giving police broad discretion and
the legal implications of unwarranted searches and seizures. The Supreme
Court's decision in Terry alluded to some of the legal and social concerns
that have arisen from the prevalent use of knock-and-talks across the
country. 147 Like a stop-and-frisk, a knock-and-talk is a tactic used by
police when there is not enough evidence to obtain a warrant; it involves
a level of intrusion where the officer should have at least reasonable
suspicion before asking about details of citizens' lives or for consent to
search.1 48 Knock-and-talks should be reviewed under Terry's reasonable
suspicion standard to limit the broad discretion police officers currently
have and to avoid violating a person's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable police intrusion.
Similar to a stop-and-frisk, to conduct a knock-and-talk the police
should be required to show reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances and be able to point to specific and articulable facts to
demonstrate that criminal activity was occurring.1 49 The search should also
be reasonable in its inception and as conducted.'o This means that an
anonymous tip should not be enough to satisfy the reasonable suspicion
requirement without specific indicia of reliability'"' because the police
would have the intention to intrude on a person's privacy at the home, and

145. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6,28, 30 (1968).
146. Id. at 20-21.
147. Id. at 10-12 (discussing "substantial interference with liberty and personal security by
police officers whose judgment is necessarily colored," and "exacerbat[ing] police-community
tensions").

148.
149.
150.
151.

Dooley, supra note 55, at 241.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
See id. at 19-20.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000).
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the home has significant constitutional protections. 152 However, numerous
tips from named informants or a tip from a previously used informant in
the past's 3 should be enough to justify the police's warrantless entry into a
home's curtilage for purposes of a search or to ask questions pertaining to
an individual's involvement in criminal activity. Hence, this standard
would allow police to efficiently conduct knock-and-talks under a clear
guideline, while protecting the fundamental civil liberties of society.
V. APPLYING THE RECOMMENDATION TO THE FACTS OF CARLOSS

-

Under the recommended standards, a knock-and-talk would be
unconstitutional unless police could show that the tactic was utilized at a
reasonable time and point to specific and articulable facts to show that
reasonable suspicion existed under the totality of the circumstances. Thus,
if the knock-and-talk is unconstitutional at inception, then any
nonattenuated evidence resulting from that tactic, including consent to
enter or search the home, are inadmissible against the defendant in court.

In Carloss's case, the police intrusion onto his curtilage may have
been constitutional despite the presence of "No Trespassing" signs
because police had reasonable suspicion to conduct the knock-and-talk.
The police in this case were alerted to the potential criminal activity of
Carloss through numerous tips from neighbors. Based on that information
alone, the police may have had reasonable suspicion to approach Carloss's
home to speak with him regarding the allegations if the informing
neighbors were readily identifiable, could face criminal penalty for giving
a false tip, or had a sufficient explanation for how they gained access to
that knowledge. The only remaining questions the court would have had
to address were whether Carloss had the authority to give consent and
whether the police conducted the knock-and-talk within the established
reasonable time constraint. If the court determined that Carloss had the
authority, though limited, to consent to officers entering the home and that
the knock-and-talk was conducted between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., the
results of Carloss would remain the same.
CONCLUSION

Through Carloss, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set an
unfavorable precedent, which fails to coincide with the special protections
the Fourth Amendment grants to the home and curtilage. Both King and
Jardineswork together to address how police should handle knock-andtalks in a way that is consistent with the Constitution under the present
jurisprudence.' 54 Despite the guidelines laid out in King and Jardines,
which attempt to control how police conduct activities in relation to
152.
153.
154.
(2011).

See discussion supra Section II.B.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469-72
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searches, the ruling of Carloss gives police officers unrestricted access to
physically intrude onto one's property in hopes of conducting a search. 151
This unrestricted power is not only a threat to those who have more contact
with police but also a threat to the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
home and curtilage. Therefore, when evaluating whether police
permissibly intruded onto the curtilage without a warrant and with
intention to commit a search, courts should consider whether the tactic
took place at a reasonable time and whether Terry's reasonable suspicion
standard was satisfied to protect the civil liberties and rights of society.
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